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A strange condition of things: alterity and knowingness 
in Dickens’ David Copperfield 
 
Richard Smith 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
It is sometimes said that we are strangers to ourselves, bearers of internal alterity, 
as well as to each other. The profounder this strangeness then the greater the 
difficulty of giving any systematic account of it without paradox: of supposing that 
our obscurity to ourselves can readily be illuminated. To attempt such an account, 
in defiance of the paradox, is to risk knowingness: a condition which, appearing to 
challenge our alterity but in fact often confirming it, holds an ambiguous place in 
the ‘ethics of belief’ and has largely escaped philosophical attention. Like alterity, 
knowingness can only be approached indirectly. Charles Dickens, in David 
Copperfield, is exemplary in the way he handles these themes. 
 
 
Keywords: alterity, knowingness, psychoanalysis, the unconscious, Freud, Charles 
Dickens 
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A strange condition of things: alterity and knowingness 
in Dickens’ David Copperfield 
 
 
 
I          Introduction 
 
The narrator of Dickens’ David Copperfield begins the novel which takes his name as 
follows: 
Whether I shall turn out to be the hero of my own life, or whether that station will 
be held by anybody else, these pages must show. To begin my life with the 
beginning of my life, I record that I was born (as I have been informed and believe) 
on a Friday, at twelve o’clock at night. It was remarked that the clock began to 
strike, and I began to cry, simultaneously. (Dickens 1974, p. 49) 
How odd it is: as if the mature David, looking back over his life as he begins his 
autobiography, would not know how that life had turned out, at least up to the point where 
he began to write about it. Or as if Dickens himself, whom we may suppose to be 
omniscient about the character of his own creation, started the novel with no idea of how it 
would proceed. Or, if the novel is semi-autobiographical, as if Dickens was similarly in the 
dark about how things had in fact gone for him. And yet the second sentence starts, it 
seems, with the firmest claim to representational veracity: these opening words mirror ‘the 
beginning of my life’, and the narrator offers us precision of day and hour, recording it as 
fact on the basis of testimony (‘as I have been informed’) and good faith (‘... and believe’). 
The close match between ‘life’ as text and ‘life’ as lived is echoed and, as it may seem, 
confirmed by the simultaneity between the striking of the clock and the crying of baby 
David, or perhaps ‘Dickens’ if we read the novel as autobiographical and David as 
somehow standing for the ‘Charles Dickens’ whom the author is here constructing, 
representing or implying. Thus the paragraph both lays claim to accuracy and admits the 
profoundest uncertainty. Even where the claim to accuracy is most insistent, in the 
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recording of the time and day of birth, an eerie note is sounded by this particular time and 
day: being born on a Friday at midnight, according to folklore, the baby will have the 
ability to see ghosts and spirits, and is destined to be unlucky.  
 
The claim to hyperbolic accuracy might be read as if it were a repudiation of the haunted 
uncertainty which is the dominant note of the opening. Against the possibility that the hero 
of his own life might be someone else (the strictly superlative word ‘own’ registers just 
how unsettling that thought is), and against the ill omen of the day and hour, the narrator 
offers the brisk reassurances of our everyday world where words are tied to realities (‘my 
life’ with ‘the beginning of my life’) and where knowledge is established on good grounds. 
These reassurances however strike a hollow note in the context of the powerful sense that 
the narrator is radically alienated from himself on the many levels indicated above; and 
they are further shaken a couple of paragraphs later by the narrator’s revelation that he was 
born with a caul, a thin membrane covering the head and face, a circumstance commonly 
supposed to confer second sight, good luck or magical protection against drowning. The 
supernatural dimension is quickly challenged however by further reminders that our world 
prefers more prosaic goods: the caul ‘was advertised for sale, in the newspapers, at the low 
price of fifteen guineas...there was but one solitary bidding, and that was from an attorney 
connected with the bill-broking business, who offered two pounds in cash, and the balance 
in sherry, but declined to be guaranteed from drowning on any higher bargain’. So the 
advertisement was withdrawn, 
and ten years afterwards, the caul was put up in a raffle down in our part of the 
country, to fifty members at half-a-crown a head, the winner to spend five shillings. 
I was present myself, and I remember to have felt quite uncomfortable and 
confused, at a part of myself being disposed of in that way. (ibid., p. 50) 
The caul was won by ‘an old lady with a hand-basket’, who paid her five shillings, ‘all in 
halfpence’, and it ‘took an immense time and a great waste of arithmetic’ to prove to her 
that she was twopence halfpenny short (ibid.). Part of the young narrator’s being, with all 
its magical possibilities, is reduced to a monetary transaction that fails at the first attempt 
and is a caricature of itself at the second. Well may he feel ‘uncomfortable and confused’ 
at a part of himself ‘being disposed of in that way’ (ibid.). 
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II Alterity 
 
Here, then, is a strange condition of things indeed. The strangeness here is radical and 
pervasive. It is strange enough to give us pause in our understanding of strangeness itself: 
of our opacity to ourselves, of how we are not at home here, of the condition of alterity, as 
it is sometimes put. If we are creatures who possess an unconscious mind, as we suppose 
we have learned from Freud (who was himself, remarkably, born with a caul: see Yalom, 
1980, p. 70), not only can we not have full self-knowledge, full access to the contents of 
our consciousnesses: it may be that the very effort to achieve knowledge about ourselves 
brings powerful temptations to self-deception and wishful thinking. Our moral 
relationships with other people then have to be conducted on the basis both that those other 
people are not fully knowable by us and that we do not fully know ourselves: an ethics of 
‘my answerability to my neighbour-with-an-unconscious’ (Santner, 2001, p. 9, his italics), 
a response to ‘the way in which the Other is disoriented in the world, destitute, divested of 
an identity’ (ibid., p. 82).   
 
‘Whether I shall turn out to be the hero of my own life’: these opening words, and the 
sense of the uncanny, where ‘every familiar is ultimately strange’ (ibid., p. 6), to which 
they form an introduction, can be read as the narrator acknowledging his own radical 
disorientation and destitution. We might be more alert to this if we recalled Dickens’ title 
for the original serial publication: David Copperfield, or The Personal History, 
Adventures, Experience and Observation of David Copperfield the Younger of 
Blunderstone Rookery (which he never meant to be published on any account). Although 
taking your name from your father was not uncommon in the nineteenth century ‘David 
Copperfield the Younger’ suggests a derivative, perhaps shadowy identity. The name of 
the house is suggestive of blundering, perhaps blind, error, and as if to confirm this the 
connection with rooks is insecure, the rooks having long departed even before David’s 
father named the house: 
‘There have not been any since we have lived here’, said my mother. ‘We 
thought – Mr. Copperfield thought – it was quite a large rookery; but 
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the nests were very old ones, and the birds have deserted them a long 
while’. 
 
‘David Copperfield all over!’ cried Miss Betsey. ‘David Copperfield from 
head to foot! Calls a house a rookery when there’s not a rook near it, 
and takes the birds on trust, because he sees the nests!’ (Dickens 1974, p. 53) 
 
By the time we reach the ironic claim that none of this was ever intended to be published, 
the list of substantive nouns (History, Adventures, Experience and Observation) begins to 
read like words that insist on substance because they know they have none. Rooks and 
similar birds (the Corvidae, including magpies and ravens) are an emblem of knowingness 
for Dickens, as we shall see below: their absence here confirms the innocence both of 
David himself, as suggested in the opening sentence, and of his dead father. 
 
 
It is not easy to stay open to the disorientation or madness of the Other, nor to one’s own; 
in the case of other people perhaps this is because their own disorientation or alienation 
reminds us too much of our own. We have all kinds of ways of erecting defences against 
what Santner calls the ‘pulsating, agitating core in ourselves, in others’ (Santner, 2001). 
One familiar kind of defence is the retreat to excessive rationality, a process sometimes 
called metabolization, that is precisely a refusal to experience the painful feelings that are 
likely to come from continuing to be open and vulnerable. In the grip of this defence we 
seek to have knowledge of the Other, attempt to define and fix their identity, rather than 
simply (but how difficult this is) to acknowledge them. Various kinds of knowledge may 
supply the closure our vulnerability craves: a medical or quasi-medical diagnosis (eg of 
‘borderline personality disorder’) reassures us that there is a problem here to be handed 
over to the competent specialists. Closed questions (‘How long have you been feeling like 
this? When exactly did it all start?’) promise straightforward answers that allow us to feel 
that something definite has been established and progress has been made. Perhaps we find 
ourselves impelled tell a story of our own, for instance of a friend who had similar issues, 
of how she dealt with them and how it all turned out.  
 
 
III Closure 
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In the case of Charles Dickens and this particular novel, ideas from psychoanalysis appear 
to offer a tempting form of closure. Many elements of the story, as is well known, echo 
episodes in Dickens’ own life: David’s experience working in the warehouse by the 
Thames strongly resembles Dickens’ own childhood months in Warren’s Blacking factory 
at Hungerford Stairs, Mr Micawber’s imprisonment for debt mirrors that of Dickens’ own 
father, and so on. The temptation is strong for Peter Ackroyd (1990). He notes (p. 565) that 
when Dickens was finishing David Copperfield he told his friend John Forster that ‘I seem 
to be sending some part of myself into the Shadowy World’. Ackroyd comments (ibid.) 
‘never has a writer’s life been so divided between wild feeling and strict control, between 
helpless sensations of loss or abandonment and the stern will for power and domination’.  
 
And yet which for him was the world of shadows and which the world of reality? 
There are occasions when he does not seem to know and, even as he wrote the first 
number,
1
 Dickens was also completing his articles on the deaths of the children at 
the Tooting juvenile pauper asylum. He was dealing with two kinds of child abuse 
one after another; the private abuse of David Copperfield at the hands of the 
Murdstones, and the public abuse of the abandoned children in the baby farm, the 
emotion induced by both spilling over into each other. (p. 567) 
 
That there are parallels and echoes between Dickens’ life and his writings, however, does 
not have to lead to explanation of the latter in terms of the former, nor to the inference that 
the strong emotions Dickens experienced arising from the difficulty of separating the two 
somehow supply the key to the power of David Copperfield. In another passage Ackroyd 
draws more explicit parallels. Dickens is 
 
David being comforted by surrogate mothers, but he is also the motherless and 
fatherless Little Em’ly; yes, he is the prostitute Martha, too, for the rules of the 
school in which David Copperfield is enrolled are the same rules which Dickens 
applied to the ‘fallen women’ of Urania Cottage.2 Everything thus becomes 
entangled, because nothing can be worked through or worked out. It would be 
death itself to do so, and the fate of Dickens would be that of the gorgon who on 
seeing its own reflection was turned to stone. This is a novel in which all his 
‘...contradictions and inconsistencies, all those ‘...erratic and perverted feelings 
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constantly at war within his breast...’, as Copperfield says of himself, are projected 
outward, sent spinning into the shadowy world, are thus for the moment quietened 
but not resolved. (pp. 608-9) 
 
Ackroyd’s language is lyrical, but it is unmistakably Freudian: what cannot be ‘worked 
through’, projection and shadows – as if here we held the key to the mind of Charles 
Dickens and, through him, to the novel; as if either could or should have any kind of key.  
 
 
In a recent study significantly titled Knowing Dickens, Rosemarie Bodenheimer (2007) 
discusses what she calls ‘Dickens’ interest in ways of knowing what we don’t know, and 
not knowing what we do know’ (p. 14): the interest which I maintain is shown in 
exemplary fashion in the opening words of David Copperfield. Bodenheimer is ambivalent 
about the usefulness of a Freudian framework in understanding how Dickens thought 
‘about the human capacity for self-knowledge’ (p. 6). She writes that ‘As the Victorian 
novelist most deeply intrigued by nineteenth-century ideas about the unconscious mind, he 
found ways to dramatize through his invented figures both subconscious processes and 
acts of self-projection’, as if Dickens was conscious of this proto-psychoanalytical 
framework (as if, we might say, he deployed it knowingly). She strengthens this 
impression when she writes that ‘Current studies of nineteenth-century physiological 
psychology bring Dickens into perspective as an early, if idiosyncratic, assimilator of pre-
Freudian ideas about the unconscious mind...’ (p. 5). Yet in the same paragraph she notes 
that because Dickens did not explain these ideas in a ‘knowing narrative voice’ it was easy 
for his critics to attribute his distinctive way of knowing, expressed through his characters, 
to ‘the vagaries of a nonrational creative process’: that is to say, as if these proto-
psychoanalytical terms were for the reader or critic to use in order to understand Dickens. 
And while she casts as problematic the practice of extrapolating from an author’s work to 
the psychodynamics of his or her life, she appears to welcome its revival on the grounds 
that the boundaries between psychoanalytic and historical approaches to interpretation are 
relatively loose (p. 16). While   Dickens has found, in the opening of David Copperfield, a 
way to write about our internal alterity without the kind of closure that knowingness 
brings, Bodenheimer’s artful play with ideas from psychoanalysis – is Dickens deploying 
them as part of his authorial technique, or is the reader to use them in order to understand 
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Dickens better than he understood himself? – seems, as does the carefully ambiguous title 
of her book, altogether too controlled. 
 
 
IV Knowingness 
 
When our knowledge fails us this is far from being always a matter of simple ignorance. 
We are creatures for whom knowledge is often coloured by what Dearden (1974) calls the 
‘ethics of belief’, for whom understanding ‘is no dry light, but receives an infusion from 
the will and affections’ (Francis Bacon, quoted by Dearden, ibid.). Our epistemic vices 
include self-deception, wishful thinking and wilful blindness. These are all ways of 
‘knowing what we don’t know, and not knowing what we do know’, to quote 
Bodenheimer once more. One seldom remarked-upon such vice is what I here call 
knowingness: that condition in which we hold our beliefs, whatever their truth and 
justifiability, with an unseemly degree of sureness or self-confidence. It is a condition that 
classical Greek thinkers were familiar with. For them its emblems included the Oedipus 
who thought his record of success (for instance, in solving the riddle of the sphinx and thus 
winning Jocasta, Queen of Thebes, in marriage) could unproblematically be extended to 
learning the truth of his own origins. It is the state of mind of many of Socrates’ 
interlocutors, particularly in the early dialogues, such as the young man Euthyphro who is 
so serenely certain of what the gods require of the righteous man that he is about to 
prosecute his own father for manslaughter:  
Socrates: Good heavens, Euthyphro! And have you such a precise knowledge of 
piety and impiety, and of divine things in general, that...you are not afraid that you 
too may be doing an impious thing in bringing an action against your father? 
Euthyphro: The best of Euthyphro, and that which distinguishes him, Socrates, 
from other men, is his exact knowledge of all these matters. (Plato, Euthyphro 4-5, 
Jowett’s translation, 1871) 
I return below to Plato’s diagnoses of knowingness. 
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Now there is a particular difficulty in developing an account of knowingness, which is that 
the greater the perspicuity and force of the account the closer it risks coming to the 
condition it analyses. It is, in short, not easy to illuminate knowingness without appearing 
knowing. We have already seen signs of this difficulty in Bodenheimer’s treatment. 
Richard Rorty (1989, p. 105) notes a similar difficulty in what he calls ‘the problem of 
how to overcome authority without claiming authority’ in offering a picture of human 
finitude. The only way to do this, Rorty thinks, is by some kind of ‘indirect 
communication’ (p. 104) such as he finds in the writing of Kierkegaard, which has the 
power to dissolve the claims of what Rorty calls ‘systematic philosophy’ without erecting 
another system in its place. This is for Rorty precisely the province of the ironic writer, the 
‘nontheorist’ to use his term (ibid.), such as Charles Dickens.  
 
Dickens gives us several glimpses of ‘knowingness’ in David Copperfield. An unnamed 
gentleman usurps David’s rightful place on the Box Seat of the Canterbury coach and does 
permanent damage to his confidence: ‘I have always considered this as the first fall I had 
in life... here, in the very first stage, I was supplanted by a shabby man with a squint, who 
had no other merit than smelling like a livery-stables, and being able to walk across me, 
more like a fly than a human being, while the horses were at a canter!’ (Dickens 1974, p. 
342). We know what we are to make of this man when we discover that he leers with ‘the 
eye with which he didn’t squint, in a very knowing manner’ (ibid.). The dwarfish Miss 
Mowcher has a habit of  
bringing her nose and her forefinger together...standing with her head necessarily 
on one side, and, with one of her sharp eyes shut up, making an uncommonly 
knowing face.. I never beheld anything approaching to Miss Mowcher’s wink 
except Miss Mowcher’s self-possession. She had a wonderful way too, when 
listening to what was said to her, or when waiting for an answer to what she had 
said herself, of pausing with her head cunningly on one side, and one eye turned up 
like a magpie’s (ibid., p. 386).  
 
Perhaps most revealingly of all, when David visits the odious Uriah Heep in prison, where 
he is ‘number Twenty Seven’, and asks the warder what crime he has been committed 
there for, the answer is ‘Fraud, forgery, and conspiracy. He and some others. He set the 
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others on. It was a deep plot for a large sum. Sentence, transportation for life. Twenty 
Seven was the knowingest bird of the lot, and had very nearly kept himself safe; but not 
quite’ (ibid., p. 929). Thus in David Copperfield knowingness implies slyness and cunning 
in contrast with innocence, the desire to have power over others, and self-aggrandisement. 
The ease with which it elides into wickedness is confirmed in The Pickwick Papers where 
two miscreants, about to emigrate to Demerara, are advised ‘not to be too knowing in the 
West Indies. If you throw away this chance, you will both richly deserve to be hanged’ 
(Dickens 1975, p. 842). 
 
 
By contrast, it is the greatest compliment that can be paid to Dr Strong, the Headmaster of 
the Canterbury school where David becomes a pupil, that he is less knowing than the birds 
of the air, whose slyness consists in redoubled, reflexive knowingness: ‘the stray rooks and 
jackdaws looking after him with their heads cocked slyly, as if they knew how much more 
knowing they were in worldly affairs than he’ (Dickens 1974, p. 294). 
 
 
Elsewhere knowingness seems to be characteristic of people who in fact lack knowledge 
and are, whether consciously or unconsciously, trying to conceal the fact. The literally 
clueless policemen in Great Expectations ‘stood about the door of the Jolly Bargemen, 
with knowing and reserved looks that filled the whole neighborhood with admiration’ 
(Dickens, 1996, p. 122). In Our Mutual Friend Mr Boffin asks Mr Wegg if he likes and 
appreciates the significance of his living arrangements.  ‘Why, in a general way, sir’, Mr 
Wegg was beginning slowly and knowingly, with his head stuck on one side, as evasive 
people do begin’ (Dickens 1979, p. 100). In The Old Curiosity Shop Dickens writes of 
‘that knowing look which people assume when they are contemplating for the first time 
portraits which they ought to recognise but don’t’ (Dickens 1978, pp. 564-566).  
 
 
Knowingness is also the distinguishing feature of people who like to think of themselves 
as men of the world. The appropriately named Mr Brass, again in The Old Curiosity Shop,   
recalls the maxim of his ‘revered father’: —‘“Always suspect everybody”. That’s the 
maxim to go through life with!’ Dickens is here moved to make a rare authorial comment:  
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With deference to the better opinion of Mr Brass, and more particularly to the 
authority of his Great Ancestor, it may be doubted, with humility, whether the 
elevating principle laid down by the latter gentleman, and acted upon by his 
descendant, is always a prudent one, or attended in practice with the desired results. 
This is, beyond question, a bold and presumptuous doubt, inasmuch as many 
distinguished characters, called men of the world, long-headed customers, knowing 
dogs, shrewd fellows, capital hands at business, and the like, have made, and do 
daily make, this axiom their polar star and compass. Still, the doubt may be gently 
insinuated. (ibid., p. 609) 
 
 
Without imputing to Dickens anything like a systematic theory here, we might think of his 
conception of  knowingness as involving ignorance while appearing, or trying to appear, 
knowledgeable when you are not, or being street-wise in a cunning, cocky way. There are 
also suggestions that it includes maintaining a high degree of cynicism about human 
nature. All of these features come together in Dickens’ savage description of the Board of 
the workhouse to which Oliver Twist is committed:  
 
The members of this board were very sage, deep, philosophical men; and 
wheaeaeaen they came to turn their attention to the workhouse, they found out at 
once, what ordinary folks would never have discovered—the poor people liked it! 
It was a regular place of public entertainment for the poorer classes; a tavern where 
there was nothing to pay; a public breakfast, dinner, tea, and supper all the year 
round; a brick and mortar elysium, where it was all play and no work. ‘Oho!’ said 
the board, looking very knowing; ‘we are the fellows to set this to rights; we’ll stop 
it all, in no time’. So, they established the rule, that all poor people should have the 
alternative (for they would compel nobody, not they), of being starved by a gradual 
process in the house, or by a quick one out of it. (Dickens 1976, p. 55) 
 
 
However nothing is quite set in stone in Dickens’ vision of knowingness. The Corvidae are 
emblematic of the condition, with their tendency to strut and incline their heads to one 
side, yet the knowingness of a raven in Barnaby Rudge can be amusing rather than sinister:  
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‘Grip, Grip, Grip – Grip the clever, Grip the wicked, Grip the 
Knowing – Grip, Grip, Grip,’ cried the raven ... ‘I’m a devil I’m a devil I’m a 
devil, Never say die Hurrah Bow wow wow, Polly put the kettle on we’ll 
all have tea’. (Dickens 1980, p. 434) 
 
Dickens himself owned a pet raven called Grip, of which he was fond. After his death its 
stuffed body was sold for a hundred and twenty pounds (Ackroyd, 1990, p. 1079). 
 
 
V  Living without answers 
 
 
I have argued above that there is a problem for the writer who identifies knowingness as a 
significant element in our alterity, our strangeness to ourselves and others, including the 
Dickens who is unavoidably the author of his texts. To put it epigrammatically: the writer 
had better not be too knowing about knowingness. Or to put it in a less compressed way, 
there is at the least a paradox in setting out a thesis – a clear and articulate thesis – to the 
effect that in our very knowingness we are obscure, perhaps then of all times most obscure, 
to ourselves. As if we were to go around confident that we are strangers to ourselves, 
radical alterity being as it were prescribed by the knowledgeable counsellor or 
psychoanalyst. To be comfortable with our own alterity (‘my counsellor says that like 
everybody else I’m a mess, and I’m fine with that’) would be a particularly far-reaching 
form of bad faith, a way of maintaining a defence against the disruptive power of the 
unconscious.  
 
 
In his Introduction to Wild Analysis, a recent translation of a collection of Freud’s papers 
(2002), Adam Phillips shows how psychoanalysis struggles with this problem. Freud 
himself was naturally drawn – and regularly encouraged by his disciples – to give some 
explanation of ‘how to do psychoanalysis’, to supply an account of its techniques. But 
there is something wrong with the idea of a technique here. ‘A technique, after all, is a 
means devised by someone to get what they want. It makes wanting make sense. A 
technique is not supposed to have an unconscious’ (p. ix). That is to say, talk of technique 
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has its home where we seek means towards ends that are unproblematically desired and 
known in advance: techniques for icing a cake, say, or for carving wood. In a world 
permeated by the notion that everything must be transparent and accountable, that (for 
instance) learning outcomes can be specified in advance of teaching, it is natural to 
suppose that every activity and practice comes down to the exercise of the techniques and 
skills that are, in this instance, what are required to take us from objectives to outcomes. 
But, in this example, if teaching is a shared exploration where the destination is not known 
in advance then teaching cannot be a straightforward matter of the exercise of techniques. 
The same is true for making relationships where, in contrast with  seduction, what counts 
as a good relationship is to an extent something we stand to discover in the process of 
forming it, and so there cannot be a technique for achieving it. Indeed the making of 
relationships with other people is the business of our lives that above all reveals how 
thinking of being human as essentially a matter of exercising skills and techniques gets 
things wrong from the start.  
 
 
Phillips writes that in Freud’s papers to which he is writing an Introduction 
 
We find Freud’s wish for definitive formulation of the means and ends of 
psychoanalysis coming up against something about the subject – the vagaries of 
unconscious desire – that makes such traditional forms of authority, of closure, 
seem somehow beside the point. As though there was something that made the 
more assured pronouncements about it sound silly; dogma staving off a sense of 
the ridiculous. (p. viii) 
 
The error lying behind the desire for ‘definitive formulation’ and ‘assured 
pronouncements’ consists partly, as I put it above (Section II), in thinking that either 
psychoanalysis or, in Santner’s phrase, my answerability to my neighbour with an 
unconscious, consists in knowledge rather than acknowledgement, in some kind of quasi-
medical diagnosis rather than receptivity to a strangeness not in any way to be 
comprehended in advance. Elsewhere Phillips expresses dismay at the way psychoanalysis 
has become thought of as a kind of science,   
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as though the aim of psychoanalysis was to make people more intelligible to 
themselves rather than to realise how strange they are. When psychoanalysis makes 
too much sense, or makes sense of too much, it turns into exactly the symptom it is 
trying to cure: defensive knowingness. (Phillips 1997, p. 87) 
 
We need, then, a way of realising, and of writing about, how strange we are that does not 
make ‘too much sense, or sense of too much’: that does not promise the wrong kind of 
answers or the definitive knowledge that can only lead to knowingness. 
 
 
As I have suggested above (in Section IV), on one interpretation of the Platonic dialogues 
Plato was dealing with the same problem. If he was concerned to convey philosophical 
solutions or timeless doctrines – the Theory of Forms, perhaps, or the Socratic method – 
then perhaps we should think of the dialogue form as merely stage-setting, designed to 
make the doctrines more palatable. However if Plato, or Socrates, or perhaps both, saw 
philosophy as a kind of therapy then, as with Freud, we might wonder if this therapy is not 
the cure for simple ignorance: we might wonder if philosophical doctrine is not the 
solution. Perhaps what we need to be released from is less a matter of not knowing than of 
being too knowing. What the Delphic oracle declared, on this interpretation, was that 
Socrates was the least knowing of men. 
 
Reading Plato’s dialogues in this way we notice that Phaedrus, in the dialogue that bears 
his name, is confidently following his doctor’s advice to take exercise outside the city 
when he meets Socrates: he is only too happy to settle for other prescriptions that are 
offered to him by experts. He has learned by heart the sophist Lysias’s rhetorical speech, 
setting out a cold, manipulative vision of human relationships. Both the lover and the one 
he wants to take to bed will benefit from this vision, so what more needs to be said? 
Phaedrus is now not just knowledgeable in this theory of relationships, as a result of 
Lysias’ teaching: he sees the skills with which this knowledge has equipped him as beyond 
criticism and as a possession to be proud of. It is the shock of Socrates’ suggestion that 
love is a kind of god-sent madness – a profound kind of alterity indeed – that jolts 
Phaedrus out of his knowingness. Theaetetus presents an instructive example of 
knowingness. He is a bright and promising young man, with a particular talent for 
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geometry. Jowett’s translation reads: ‘He moves surely and smoothly and successfully in 
the path of knowledge and enquiry; and he is full of gentleness, flowing on silently like a 
river of oil; at his age, it is wonderful’ (Theaetetus 144b). What is it to have a mind that 
works like this, than to be too knowing? 
Coming to Dickens through Plato and Freud we can see more clearly the difficulty 
Dickens was encountering, the difficulty of being knowing about knowingness, and the 
power of his way of dealing with the difficulty. It is a way of acknowledging alterity that 
could perhaps only be undertaken by a novelist, a story-teller or at any rate a writer, rather 
than a systematic philosophical thinker.
3
   
 
 * * * * * * 
 
Chapter 44 of David Copperfield begins: ‘It was a strange condition of things, the honey-
moon being over, and the bridesmaids gone home when I found myself sitting down in my 
own small house with Dora’. Alone at last, the newly-weds struggle with their servants, 
with tradesmen and with all manner of practicalities. Dora’s inability to manage the 
household accounts (‘They won’t come right. They make my head ache so. And they 
won’t do anything I want’) seems symptomatic of the chaos which has descended. When 
David attempts to reason with Dora she declares that she ‘didn’t marry to be reasoned 
with’. Reason and knowledge are in danger of failure here, and so too is 
acknowledgement. Dora calls David ‘Doady’ and asks him to think of her as his ‘Child-
wife’: where there might be acknowledgement there is instead fantasy. Well may David’s 
aunt describe them as ‘a pair of babes in the wood’ (ibid.).  
 
 
David felt ‘I could have wished my wife had been my counsellor’, less either to know or 
acknowledge him than as one ‘endowed with power to fill up the void which somewhere 
seemed to be about me’ (ibid.). So strong is his sense of confusion that even the void is 
only ‘somewhere’, a void of seeming. This is a cloud not of knowingness but of 
unknowing. ‘David’ writes, ‘I search my breast, and I commit its secrets, if I know them, 
without any reservation to this paper’ (ibid.). We might dwell a little on the phrase, ‘if I 
know them’, that echoes the marvellous diffidence of the novel’s opening, and dwell too 
on the oddity of writing what you do not entirely know ‘without reservation’. In the same 
16 
 
chapter ‘David’ tells us that he ‘wrote a good deal now, and was beginning in a small way 
to be known as a writer’ (ibid.). He writes, then, a good deal of what he does not entirely 
know. How very productive is his unknowingness, and the mystery that he is to himself.
4
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NOTES 
 
                                                          
1
 ie the first of the serial issues in which David Copperfield was first published. 
2
 A charitable enterprise which Dickens supported.  
3
 It is more and more coming to be accepted that despite the remarks in the Phaedrus about 
the priority of the living word over writing, and the expulsion of the poets from the ideal 
polis in The Republic, we get Plato wrong from the outset if we do not read his texts as 
primarily those of a writer rather than what we would now think of as a systematic 
philosopher. See eg Statkiewicz, 2009. 
4
 I am grateful to the journal’s anonymous reviewers for their very helpful criticisms of an 
earlier version of this paper.   
